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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001552

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UG](#) [SU](#) [CG](#)
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: KONY FAILS TO SIGN PEACE
DEAL...AGAIN

REF: KAMPALA 1545

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony told a delegation of LRA negotiators, northern elders, and parliamentarians that he will not sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) until the International Criminal Court (ICC) lifts the warrants against the LRA leadership. Kony also raised other complaints during the meetings on November 29 and 30. LRA delegation leader, Dr. David Matsanga, said that Kony was under significant pressure from LRA senior officers not to sign the deal, but also is facing serious dissension among lower ranking officers, who mistakenly believe the FPA is the only way they will get out of the bush. The next steps in the process are not yet clear. End Summary.

KONY MEETS NORTHERN DELEGATION

¶2. (U) LRA leader Joseph Kony met with his delegation leader, Dr. David Matsanga, northern Ugandan elders and religious leaders, and several northern parliamentarians on November 29 and 30. The gathering was the outcome of a stakeholders' meeting held in Kampala on November 5, which had urged Kony to sign the FPA by the end of the month. This was considered by many to be Kony's last chance to demonstrate interest in peace after skipping five previously attempted meetings. Kony did not/not go to the Rikwangba assembly area, but instead had the group meet him some five kilometers away inside the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

¶3. (C) The parliamentarians were taken aback by Kony's disrespect for them and Acholi Paramount Chief, Rwot Acana. The group was stripped naked and their belongings, including money, were taken. Their satellite telephones were seized. A member of the GOU delegation said that the elders and members of parliament were held "hostage" until about one hundred LRA child slaves portered the food from four lorries from Rikwangba to Kony's camp. The food was supposed to be held at Rikwangba for the anticipated signing ceremony. Kony reportedly demanded that AFEX, a local southern Sudanese logistics company, send food in for the visiting delegation to eat, according to Captain Okello, a member of the GOU delegation. The group re-emerged from the bush late in the afternoon of November 30 and traveled back to Juba with the GOU delegation, Machar, and Chissano in the evening. Kony's lack of contact with the mediator irritated Machar and Chissano, who were waiting, frustrated, in Rikwangba.

KONY RAISED THE SAME OLD DEMANDS

¶4. (C) Kony's primary reason for refusing to sign the FPA remains the ICC arrest warrants for Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen. Kony told the participants that he would not

sign any peace deal until the ICC warrants are lifted.
(Note: Kony has been consistent on this demand since the warrants were issued in 2005. End Note.) Kony wants a way out of the "ICC confusion", according to Matsanga, and claims Kony will send a group of five, including military officers, to Juba to "finalize" the FPA's provisions on the ICC. Kony also says he will appoint two new members to the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT). (Note: Machar unilaterally extended the life of the CHMT even though the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement expired in May (reftel). Kony also raised concerns that the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP) was not being implemented and that northerners were returning home without farm implements.

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MATSANGA: THIS IS NOT THE END OF THE STORY
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15. (C) LRA delegation leader Matsanga admitted to P/E Chief on November 30 that Kony had once again "disappointed us" and urged the United States to back the continuing efforts of Machar to resolve the LRA conflict peacefully. He argued that military options are more expensive than peace options. He suggested that this included providing support to the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group (JLG), called for in the FPA and which consists of three representatives from the GOU, three LRA delegates, and a person nominated by Machar to chair the group. Its purpose is to oversee the implementation of the FPA.

16. (C) Matsanga brushed aside P/E Chief's question on how the donor community could support the JLG without a signed

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peace agreement. Matsanga said that Kony had not refused to sign the document, but instead asked for "correction and clarification." He then contradicted himself and said that "Kony's signature will be elusive for the next ten years." Matsanga added that Kony had appointed Nairobi-based LRA loyalists, Justine Labeja and Margaret Abolo, to represent him on the JLG.

17. (C) Matsanga, who sounded drunk and who rambled, said that "he knew that the U.S. was sending tomahawks from the Indian Ocean to Garamba." He also said that the U.S. "wants Kony to come home horizontally." (Note: This is a reference to remarks made by President Museveni in September that Kony could sign the peace deal and come home vertically, or he could come home horizontally if he did not sign. End Note.) He urged the U.S. to support Machar's "avenue to peace" instead.

18. (C) He also tried to scapegoat Jolly Okot Lacor, Kony's childhood friend and a sometimes confidante, for sending Kony a text message reminding him that it would be difficult for him to come back home because he had killed many people in northern Uganda. Matsanga claimed that Kony refused to sign because he interpreted the text message to mean that he would not be safe in Uganda. He accused the U.S. and other countries of offering Kony exile and promoting defection, which has split LRA members.

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DISSENSION WITHIN KONY'S CAMP
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19. (C) Kony was "besieged by his own generals" not to sign the agreement, Matsanga explained. Members of the GOU team and Chissano's office confirm problems within the LRA camp. Allegedly, ICC indictees LRA deputy Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen are adamantly against Kony signing the peace deal because they fear Kony would get a light sentence or even exile and that they would bear the brunt of the ICC warrants. On November 27, Odhiambo told a contact in Nairobi that Kony was upset that none of the lawyers he had requested showed up, according to Jolly Okot Lacor. (Note: The two lawyers, Jane Anwyar and Jacob Olanya, had committed to attend and

then backed out on November 28 without explanation. There is reason to believe that the GOU persuaded them not to go as a way of sabotaging the meeting. End note.)

¶10. (C) BG Bok Abudema, who is not one of the current indictees, reportedly fears that he will be indicted soon due to his activities directing the abductions and attacks in eastern DRC, according to Warner Ten Kate, the head of Chissano's Kampala Office. Kony also is under pressure from lower ranking officers and other captives to sign the FPA so that they can return home. Kony reportedly has told them that they will not receive amnesty if they return to Uganda outside the peace agreement. This group is extremely disappointed by Kony's refusal to sign the deal, according to Ten Kate.

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COMMENT
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¶11. (SBU) We do not yet have a read-out from the meeting that Machar held with Chissano and the parties in Juba on December 1. GOU delegation members expressed concern that Machar will advocate for yet another last chance for Kony. Chissano reportedly will meet with President Museveni later in the evening or on December 2. Museveni reportedly will tell Chissano that Uganda has had enough of the peace process. We will follow up with the parties upon their arrival to Kampala and report septel.
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